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This article explores the implications of hysteresis for the welfare costs of recessions by extending the textbook
New Keynesian model to include hysteresis. Hysteresis implies that recessions reduce the level of potential output.
Famously Lucas (1987, 2003) argued that the welfare costs of business cycles are negligible without hysteresis.
This article demonstrates that the welfare costs of recessions are huge (negligible) in the New Keynesian model
with (without) hysteresis. The main finding is that an empirically observed degree of hysteresis increases the
welfare costs of a recession by a factor of 121. The results are in contrast with Lucas (1987, 2003), who concluded
that only changes in the long-term growth rate of consumption have a significant welfare effect. The welfare costs
of recessions can be huge without a change in the long-term growth rate of consumption. Hysteresis therefore
implies that stabilization policy should respond forcefully to recessions.1. Introduction
How large are the welfare costs of business cycles? In the dictionary of
economics, the welfare costs of business cycles mean the benefits in terms
of consumption that households would get from eliminating all business
cycles of the economy (Imrohoroglu 2008). The famous conclusions of
Lucas (1987, 2003) are that the welfare costs of business cycles and the
potential benefits from stabilization policy are negligible. He assumes
that risk-averse households would prefer a deterministic consumption
path to a risky one with the same mean level of consumption. In his
framework, the welfare benefits from eliminating business cycles are
insignificant, since business cycles are just temporary fluctuations around
an exogenous trend and the observed volatility of aggregate consumption
around a trend is small. Only changes in the long-term growth rate of
consumption have a substantial welfare effect, and the growth rate is
assumed to be independent of aggregate demand. Therefore, Lucas’ view
was that academic economists and policymakers should focus on the
determinants of long-term economic growth rather than stabilization
policy.
In a survey article, Imrohoroglu (2008) wrote that many assumptions
in the framework of Lucas (1987, 2003) have been challenged. The
welfare costs of business cycles may be somewhat greater than Lucas
implied. However, Imrohoroglu (2008) concluded that: “the weight of
the evidence seems to suggest that they may not be too high for the US
economy.” More recently, Walentin and Westermark (2018a) stressed
that “[a]lthough most people hold the belief that business cycles are
costly, the dominating macroeconomic theories of recent decades – bothrm 14 December 2020; Accepted
evier B.V. This is an open access areal business cycle theory and new Keynesian theory – imply that the
welfare cost of output fluctuations are negligible.”
The contribution of this paper is to examine the implications of hys-
teresis for the welfare costs of recessions. Hysteresis means that re-
cessions lower the level of potential output. I extend the textbook version
of the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model of Gali (2015) to include hysteresis. The empirical observations
that recessions have permanent economic costs in terms of lost con-
sumption should lead us to conclude that the welfare costs of business
cycles are measured in terms of the welfare value of permanently lost
consumption. Barnichon et al. (2018, 4) argued that a financial crisis
“can have large costs in terms of societal welfare by causing persistent
losses in the level of GDP.” In this paper, I measure the welfare costs of
business cycles in terms of the value of permanently lost consumption.
The volatility of consumption, the approach of Lucas (1987, 2003),
would be a good way to measure the welfare losses of business cycles, if
business cycles were just temporary fluctuations around a trend.
The literature on the welfare costs of business cycles relies on the
traditional view of business cycles. Cerra and Saxena (2017) argue that
the problem is that the data do not support this view. The view is shown
in Fig. 1(a). They claim that it assumes that supply-side components
bring about an upward trend in potential output and demand shocks
cause temporary fluctuations around a trend. A recession is a temporary
drop in output, which bounces back to its pre-recession trend during the
recovery. New research has found that recessions may have a permanent
effect on the level of output relative to the pre-recession trend. Ball
(2014) found that the damage to potential output is almost as great as the14 December 2020
rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
Fig. 1. Views of business cycles.
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OECD countries. Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) discovered that one per-
centage point in the negative output gap reduced potential output by an
average of 0.4% in OECD countries in the Great Recession. Blanchard
et al. (2015) discovered that two-thirds of recessions are followed by low
output relative to the pre-recession trend even after the recovery phase of
the business cycle. Martin et al. (2015) also did not find empirical support
for the traditional view. They emphasized that the hysteresis effect raises
questions about how we should model potential output around re-
cessions. The hysteresis view of the present paper, shown in Fig. 1(b), is
that the new trend is parallel to the pre-recession trend, but below it.
Empirical studies suggest that an endogenous drop in total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) is the main reason for output hysteresis (Adler et al.,
2017; Anzoategui et al., 2019). I follow the work of Engler and Tervala
(2018), in which negative demand shocks can induce TFP hysteresis via
learning-by-doing.
In this paper, I show that the welfare cost of a recession in which the
deviation of output from trend is 3% is only 0.6% of consumption in the
basic New Keynesian DSGE model without hysteresis. The welfare cost of
a recession obviously depends on its size, which is based on Martin et al.
(2015). They find that the average deviation of output from the
pre-recession trend one year after the start of a recession is roughly 3%.
The welfare cost is measured as the net present value of the percentage of
initial consumption that the household is willing to pay in order to avoid
the recession. In the textbook New Keynesian model, an average-sized
recession causes a very short-lived decline in consumption. Conse-
quently, the welfare loss is negligible in the absence of hysteresis. My
finding is consistent with Walentin and Westermark (2018a), who
pointed out that in New Keynesian models, the welfare costs of inflation
variability are “a fraction of a percent of average utility.”
The main finding of this paper is that hysteresis has drastic conse-
quences for the welfare costs of recessions. Rawdanowicz et al. (2014, 8)
defined the hysteresis parameter as “the impact of one percentage point
of the negative output gap on reducing potential output”. They find that
hysteresis is 0.1 for the U.S. In this paper, I show that this small degree of
hysteresis increases the welfare cost of a recession – by a factor of 47 – to
27.3% of consumption in a New Keynesian model. This result may un-
derestimate the welfare costs of recessions, because Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014) discovered that the average degree of hysteresis in OECD coun-
tries is 0.4. In this paper, I show that this extent of hysteresis implies that
the welfare costs of a recession increases to 70%. Hence, a realistic extent
of output hysteresis raises the welfare loss by a factor of 121. The reason
for the massive welfare loss is a permanent fall in the level of con-
sumption. The welfare loss is dependent on the depth of the recession.
The deeper the recession is, the higher the welfare loss is. It is worth
observing that the model with hysteresis can match the empirical137observations of Jorda et al. (2020). They find that monetary shocks cause
TFP and output hysteresis. The basic New Keynesian model is unable to
match these observations.
My results in this article are in sharp contrast with Lucas (1987, 2003)
and the associated literature, which concluded that only changes in the
long-term growth rate of consumption have a significant welfare effect.
Walentin and Westermark (2018b), the most directly related paper,
found that employment hysteresis raises the welfare costs of recessions by
a factor of six in their basic case. My findings show that TFP hysteresis,
which creates a realistic extent of output hysteresis, increases the welfare
loss significantly more. In addition, the framework of Walentin and
Westermark (2018b) is inconsistent with the empirical evidence of
Martin et al. (2015) and Jorda et al. (2020). They show that employment
returns to the old trend after normal recessions and monetary shocks. I
conclude that the welfare costs of recessions – in the presence of TFP
hysteresis – may be very large and that stabilization policy should be a
high priority for academic economists and policymakers.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the parameteri-
zation. Section 4 studies the implications of hysteresis for the welfare
costs of recessions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Gali (2015, Chapter 3) offers an overview of the New Keynesian
framework that has been used extensively to understand business cycles
and economic policy. I extend it with hysteresis. The model’s features
and notation follow Gali (2015) as closely as possible. The size of the
economy is normalized to unit size. A continuum of households and firms
are indexed by i 2 ½0; 1.2.1. Demand side: households












where Ct stands for a consumption index, Nt is the employment (hours
worked) of the household, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1=ϕ.








where CtðiÞ denotes the consumption of good i and ε denotes the elasticity
















The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt þQtBt ¼ Bt1 þWtNt þ Dt : (3)
Bt is the holding of one-period nominal discount bonds held at the end of
period t. The bonds pay one currency whenmaturing in period tþ 1. The
price of the bond is Qt ¼ 1=ð1 þ itÞ, where it is the nominal interest rate.
Wt denotes the nominal wage, and Dt is nominal dividends of the firms
that the household own.
The household’s optimality conditions for consumption and
employment are








2.2. Supply side: firms and productivity
Output hysteresis can be induced by a permanent fall in employment,
capital accumulation or TFP. Martin et al. (2015) found empirically that
employment returns to its pre-recession level trend after normal re-
cessions. They also found that investment falls only during deep re-
cessions. Adler et al. (2017) and Furceri et al. (2021) found empirically
that deep recessions cause a persistent drop in the level of TFP. Adler
et al. (2017) emphasized that TFP hysteresis is the main contributor to
significant output losses relative to pre-recession trends. Bardaka et al.
(2020) found empirically that negative demand (austerity) shocks have a
negative effect on TFP in the short and long term. Anzoategui et al.
(2019) found that a significant fraction of the post-Great Recession TFP
slowdown was an endogenous response to the fall in demand. Empirical
studies hint that TFP hysteresis is likely to the main reason for output
hysteresis.
Firms are assumed to produce differentiated goods. The production
function is
YtðiÞ¼AtðiÞNtðiÞ1α; (6)
where YtðiÞ is the output of the firm i, At is the level of TFP, and 1 α is
the output elasticity of employment. As in Gali (2015), private capital is
omitted from the production function. As in Chang et al. (2002), Tervala
(2013), and Engler and Tervala (2018), a change in the level of TFP is
determined by the following log-linear equation:
bAtðiÞ¼ ρAbAt1ðiÞ þ μbNt1ðiÞ: (7)
0  ρA  1 is the persistence of the changes in TFP and μ is the elasticity
of TFP with respect to past employment. Hatted variables represent
percentage deviations from the initial steady (e.g., bAtðiÞ ¼ dAtðiÞ= A0ðiÞ;
where the zero subscript indicates the initial steady state). Equation (7)
generates a link between business cycles and potential output: A fall in
employment today reduces TFP tomorrow, with an elasticity of μ. TFP
depreciates at the rate of 1 ρA. Strictly speaking, hysteresis requires
that ρA ¼ 1. Then a change in employment affects the level of TFP138permanently. For computational reasons, however, ρA is set at 0.999999.
Therefore, a recession has a quasi-permanent effect on TFP and output,
but they eventually return to the initial equilibrium.
The firm maximizes its profits
П tðiÞ¼PtðiÞYtðiÞ WtNtðiÞ; (8)
subject to the production function (6) and the demand function (2). The




Under flexible prices, the price is a constant mark-up over the mar-
ginal cost, which is
MCtðiÞ¼ WtAtðiÞð1 αÞNtðiÞ:
As in Calvo (1983), firms can set their prices with the probability of
1 θ in each period. It is independent of the time since the last price



















A log-linearized version of it is
bPtðzÞ¼ βγbPtþ1ðiÞ þ ð1 βγÞ bWt  bAtðiÞþ αbNtðiÞ:
The change in the optimal price is a weighted average of the changes
in current and future marginal costs. A reduction in TFP increases the
optimal price.
2.3. Monetary policy
In the basic New Keynesian framework, including Gali (2015),
monetary policy is characterized by the Taylor rule (see Taylor 1993).
The central bank adjusts the interest rate based on the deviations of
inflation and output from their targets. In this paper, I assume that a
source for a recession is a drop in demand. I assume that a monetary
shock causes a recession and a negative output gap. This brings about a
reduction in employment, which then reduces the level of TFP, and thus
potential output. In this type of analysis, it makes little sense to have the
output gap in the monetary policy rule. The central bank follows a
log-linear Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
bit ¼ð1 ρiÞφπΔbPt þ ρibit1 þ ωt: (10)
Coefficient ρi measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, φπ is the
coefficient for inflation in the monetary policy rule, Δ is the first-
difference operator, and ωt represents unexpected monetary shocks. I
wish to emphasize that I do not argue that monetary policy shocks are the
main cause of recessions; a positive monetary policy shock is just a
practical source for a recession in the model.
2.4. Initial steady state
All firms are identical. Firms that set a price, in any period, choose the
same price and output. The initial level of employment, which is needed








The baseline parameterization of the model, shown in Table 1, fol-
lows Gali (2015) as much as possible. Periods represent quarters and the
discount factor ðβÞ is set at 0.99. This implies a 4% steady state annual
real interest rate. The elasticity of substitution of goods ðεÞ is set at 9. It
implies a 12.5% markup over the marginal cost in the steady state. The
Calvo parameter ðθÞ is set at 0.75. This means that the average price
duration is one year. α is set at 0.25. This implies that the elasticity of
output with respect to employment is 0.75. The coefficient for inflation
ðφπÞ in the Taylor rule is set at 1.5.
The monetary policy rule differs from Gali (2015) because of interest
rate smoothing. The smoothing parameter ðρiÞis set at 0.8. This is a
common value in the New Keynesian literature and is consistent with
Clarida et al. (2000).
The value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply has been debated,
partly because micro and macro elasticities differ greatly. The micro
elasticity typically refers to the Frisch elasticity of individuals’ hours of
work and it is estimated using micro data. The macro elasticity refers to
the elasticity of the aggregate hours worked in the economy and it is
estimated using macro data. In a review, Whalen and Reichling (2017)
argued that estimates of the Frisch elasticity based on macro data are
much larger. They found that estimates of the micro elasticity for the
intensive margin range from zero to more than one. Keane and Rogersson
(2012) found that small estimates for the micro elasticity are fully
consistent with the large macro elasticities. They concluded that the
macro elasticity exists in the range of 1–2. Gali (2015) sets it at 0.2. It
may be too small a value at the macro level. I setϕ at one, so the Frisch
elasticity is one. Gali et al. (2007), for example, use this value in
analyzing the welfare costs of business cycles.
A near unit persistence of TFP is meant to serve as a reduced-form
mechanism to capture long-lasting effects of recessions. The persistence
of TFP ðρAÞ is set at 0.999999. Consequently, a recession has a quasi-
permanent effect on the level of TFP and output. This is consistent
with empirical evidence. The elasticity of TFP with respect to employ-
ment (μ) is a crucial parameter since it determines the degree of hys-
teresis. Chang et al. (2002) estimated that it is 0.11. It is chosen as the
baseline value. However, the welfare costs of recessions are very sensitive
to it. Therefore, I study in detail how the main results depend on it.
Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) found that 25 out of 32 OECD countries
suffered from hysteresis in the Great Recession. They discover that the
hysteresis parameter is 0.1 in the U.S. and 0.3 in the euro area. The
average degree of hysteresis, including countries without hysteresis, is
0.4. The median value is 0.35. In the present model, following Engler and
Tervala (2018), the degree of hysteresis is measured as the ratio of the fallTable 1




β 0.99 Discount factor Gali (2015)
ε 9 Elasticity of substitutability Gali (2015)
α 0.25 1 α is the output elasticity of labor Gali (2015)
θ 0.75 Calvo parameter Gali (2015)
φπ 1.5 Coefficient for inflation in the monetary
policy rule
Gali (2015)
ρi 0.8 Interest rate smoothing Clarida et al.
(2000)
ϕ 1 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity Gali et al. (2007)
ρA 0.999999 Persistence of TFP changes Assumption




139in output in the 20th period, when prices have fully adjusted, to the fall in
output in the first period. Under the baseline parameterization, the de-
gree of hysteresis is 0.21. I vary the elasticity of TFP with respect to
employment within the range of 0–0.29. So, the degree of hysteresis is in
the range of 0–0.4.
The size of the contractionary monetary shock is set so that the depth
of a recession matches the empirical estimates on the effects of recessions
on the deviation of output from a trend. Martin et al. (2015) studied the
consequences of recessions on the long-term level of GDP in 23 advanced
economies over 40 years. They found that the average deviation of GDP
from the pre-recession trend one year after the beginning of a recession is
roughly 3%. Therefore, I set the size of a contractionary monetary shock
so that it would bring about a 3% deviation of output. Under the baseline
parameterization and the presence of hysteresis, the monetary shock is
set at 325 basis points.1
4. Welfare costs of recessions
4.1. Lucas’ view
Lucas (1987, 2003) analyzed the welfare effects of eliminating con-
sumption fluctuations, considering a representative household, which is
given a consumption stream
Ct ¼Aegteð0:5Þδ2εt:
A is the initial level of consumption, g is the growth rate of con-
sumption, δ is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of con-













where E0 denotes the expectations operator, 0 < β < 1 denotes the dis-
count factor, and γ is the relative risk aversion parameter. A risk-averse
household prefers a deterministic consumption path to a risky one with
the same mean. Lucas measured the utility difference in consumption
equivalent terms, denoted by λ, so that the household is indifferent be-
tween the deterministic consumption path and the risky path. The wel-





It depends on the size of the consumption risk and the risk aversion
for it. Lucas (2003) estimated that the standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of real per capita consumption is 0.032 in the U.S. In the baseline
calculation, he assumes log utility for consumption (γ ¼ 1). Therefore,
Lucas (2003) concluded that the welfare cost is 0.05% of consumption. In
Lucas (1987), the welfare loss is 0.008%, because the standard deviation
of consumption is set at 0.013.
4.2. Method of welfare analysis
I evaluate the welfare losses of recessions as a percentage of initial
consumption that the household in the case without a recession is willing
to pay to avoid the recession and thus to be as well off in the recession
case as in the case without the recession. This follows the idea of Lucas
(1987, 2003) and a more recent approach of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007). Let fCNRs ;NNRs g∞s¼t be the consumption and employment paths
with no recession (NR). Then the net present value (NPV) of welfare is1 The model is solved using Klein’s (2000) method and McCallum’s (2001)
software.





	 NNRs 	1þϕ :Table 2
Hysteresis and the welfare costs of recessions.
Elasticity of TFP with respect to
employment












I define λf as the NPV of the welfare cost of a recession (R) relative to a
case without the recession. For now, I measure it as a fraction of con-















1 λf 	þ UNRNPV :
The next step is to solve for λf . In addition, the welfare cost of a
recession is now expressed as the percentage of consumption (denoted by
λ).
λ¼  100 
expð1 βÞURNPV UNRNPV	 1: (12)
The utility function’s first-order Taylor expansion is







bCBSs ðN0Þ1þϕ bNBSs :
Welfare in the case without business cycles is the same as in the initial
equilibrium. Therefore, the equation above can be substituted into






βst bCBSs ðN0Þ1þϕ bNBSs  1: (13)
Equation (13) calculates the welfare costs of recessions as the per-
centage of initial consumption that the household in the case without a
recession is willing to pay in order to avoid the recession and be as well
off in the recession case as in the case without the recession. In a figure,




bCBSs ðN0Þ1þϕ bNBSs  1:
The welfare loss of business cycles typically refers to equation (13),
which measures the NPV.Fig. 2. Dynamic responses of key vari
1404.3. Degree of hysteresis and the costs of recessions
Fig. 2 displays the impulse responses of the main variables to a
monetary shock. The horizontal axes show time. The vertical axes typi-
cally display percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Inflation
and interest rate, however, are expressed as percentage point deviations
in annual terms. The welfare cost is denoted in the percentage of initial
consumption. The solid lines represent the case without hysteresis. The
dashed lines represent the case with hysteresis. As discussed in Section 3,
the size of the monetary shock is always set so that it causes a three
percent fall in output.
Without hysteresis, the model is virtually identical to Gali (2015,
Chapter 3) and the effects of a monetary policy shock are identical to
those in it. Only the size of the shock is different (in this paper 340 basis
points, in Gali (2015) 100 points). An increase in the nominal interest
rate, shown in Fig. 2(f), causes a rise in the real interest rate. This sub-
sequently causes a contraction in household consumption. Consequently,
output (Panel (a)) and employment (Panel (b)) fall in the short term. In
the long term, prices adjust and consumption, output, employment and
welfare (Panel (d)) return to their initial levels. In imperfectly competi-
tive economies, identical declines in consumption and employment cause
a fall in welfare. Fig. 2(d) shows a very short-lived fall in welfare. Table 2
shows that the welfare loss of a recession is only 0.6% of consumption.
In the presence of hysteresis, the size of the monetary shock is
reduced to 325 basis points so that the initial drop in output remains at
3%. Equation (7) implies that a fall in demand and employment, caused
by a rise in the real interest rate, has a persistent and negative effect on
TFP, shown in Fig. 2(c). TFP hysteresis brings about a permanent fall inables without and with hysteresis.
0.227 0.35 66.7
0.29 0.40 70.2
J. Tervala Economic Modelling 95 (2021) 136–144aggregate supply, causing output hysteresis and a permanent fall in
consumption, shown in Fig. 2(a). However, employment reverts to its
initial level (Fig. 2(b)). In the medium and long term, households expe-
rience a fall in welfare (Fig. 2(d)), due to a reduction in consumption and
unchanged employment. Table 2 shows that hysteresis increases the
welfare cost of a recession from 0.6% to 47.1%.
Moran and Queralto (2018) found empirical evidence that an
expansionary monetary policy has a positive effect on TFP. The
medium-term effect is stronger than the short-term effect. However, the
TFP effect is long-lived. The behavior of TFP in this model is in line with
this evidence. Jorda et al. (2020) found empirically that output and TFP
are affected for a very long time. They do not revert to their pre-shock
trends. However, employment (total hours worked) reverts swiftly to
the pre-shock trend. Fig. 2 shows that the responses of output, TFP and
employment in the model with hysteresis are fully consistent with the
empirical observations. The model without hysteresis, i.e. the basic New
Keynesian model, cannot match the observed behavior of output and
TFP.
As mentioned, the degree of hysteresis is defined as the ratio of the
drop in output in the 20th period to the drop in output in the first period.
This definition is consistent with the definition of Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014), because the drop in first-period output measures the output gap
in the first period. In the baseline case (μ¼ 0.11), the degree of hysteresis
is 0.21. This is in the middle range of the estimates of Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014).
Next, I analyze the dependence of the welfare losses of recessions on
the degree of hysteresis. The elasticity of TFP with respect to employment
is varied so that the degree of hysteresis is at the desired level. At the
same time, the size of the monetary policy shock was changed so that the
fall in output would remain at 3% (the higher the degree of hysteresis,
the smaller the monetary shock). As mentioned, Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014) discovered that the hysteresis parameter is 0.1 in the U.S. and 0.3
in the euro area. In Fig. 3, the solid lines represent the case where hys-
teresis is 0.1 (μ is set at 0.05), the dashed lines represent the baseline case
where hysteresis is 0.21 (μ ¼ 0.11), and the dashed lines with a star
represent the case where hysteresis is 0.3 (μ ¼ 0.18).
Table 2 highlights that the welfare losses of recessions are highly
sensitive to changes in the degree of hysteresis. Fig. 3(a) shows that the
higher the degree of hysteresis, the larger the fall in consumption. The
hysteresis estimate of Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) for the U.S. (0.1) im-
plies that the welfare cost increases to 27.3% of consumption. This is 47
times the welfare cost without hysteresis. This may underestimate theFig. 3. Dynamic responses of ke
141welfare cost of some recessions, since Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) esti-
mated that the average degree of hysteresis in OECD countries during the
Great Recession was 0.4. Table 2 shows that this degree of hysteresis
implies that the welfare cost of a recession is as high as 70% of con-
sumption. It is 121 times the welfare cost without hysteresis. In this
model, the degree of hysteresis is 0.4, when the elasticity of TFP with
respect to employment set at 0.29. This is higher than the empirical es-
timate (0.11) of Chang et al. (2002). However, Jorda et al. (2020) esti-
mated that the elasticity of TFP with respect to output fluctuations is
0.42. With this estimate, equations (6) and (7) and the assumption that α
¼ 0.25 imply that the elasticity of TFP with respect to employment is
0.32. Therefore, the link between business cycles and TFP is likely to be
stronger than the estimate of Chang et al. (2002) suggests.
4.4. Related literature
As mentioned, Lucas (2003) finds that the welfare loss is 0.05% in
each period, when the standard deviation of consumption is 3.2%. The
numbers in the present paper are not fully comparable with his numbers,
since I focus on analyzing the NPV of the welfare cost of a 3% drop in
consumption. However, Fig. 3(d), shows the welfare cost in each period.
When the extent of hysteresis is in the range to 0.1 to 0.3, the welfare cost
ranges from 0.32% to 0.92% of initial consumption in the 20th period.
Since the Lucas (1987) publication, several studies have challenged
its main findings. Barlevy (2005) classified these studies according to the
features of Lucas’ model that they modify. The first group has modified
preferences or the persistence of shocks (including Dolmas 1998; Pem-
berton 1996; Obstfeld 1994; Otrok 2001; Tallarini 2000). For example, a
higher degree of risk aversion increases the welfare costs of business
cycles. Barlevy (2005) argued that these studies find that the losses of
business cycles are small, although they may be higher than in Lucas
(1987). Dolmas (1998) finds that welfare costs can be up to 20% of
consumption in each period if shocks affect the long-term growth rate of
consumption. However, the result supports Lucas’ (1987) claim that the
welfare costs of a change in the long-term growth rate of consumption are
substantial.
The second group of studies (including De Santis 2007, Chatterjee
and Corbae 2007, Imrohoroglu 1989 and Storesletten et al., 2001) has
calibrated consumption risk to match household data rather than
aggregate data, since the consumption of some individuals declines much
more during recessions than aggregate consumption (Barlevy 2005).
Some of these studies have suggested that the welfare losses of businessy variables with hysteresis.
Table 3
Sensitivity analysis.
Row Parameter Hysteresis Welfare cost of a recession
1 Baseline 0.21 47.1
2 β ¼ 0:95ðβ ¼ 0:99Þ 0.19 46.2
3 ε ¼ 6ðε ¼ 9Þ 0.21 47.3
4 ε ¼ 21ðε ¼ 9Þ 0.21 47.0
5 ϕ ¼ 5 ðϕ ¼ 1Þ 0.17 41.3
6 ϕ ¼ 0:5 ðϕ ¼ 1Þ 0.21 48.1
7 α ¼ 0:33 ðα ¼ 0:25Þ 0.22 49.6
8 α ¼ 0 ðα ¼ 0:25Þ 0.17 40.8
9 θ ¼ 0:5 ðθ ¼ 0:75Þ 0.16 38.1
10 ρA ¼ 0:99 ðρA ¼ 0:999999Þ 0.17 27.6
11 ρA ¼ 0:96 ðρA ¼ 0:999999Þ 0.091 12.5
12 ρA ¼ 0:86 ðρA ¼ 0:999999Þ 0 4.8
J. Tervala Economic Modelling 95 (2021) 136–144cycles are somewhat higher than Lucas (1987, 2003) estimated.
The third group of studies, including Epaulard and Pommeret (2003),
assumes that stabilization policy affects long-term growth through in-
vestment. This channel increases the welfare loss of business cycles, but it
is still less than 0.5% in each period. Fig. 3(d) shows that under the
baseline parameterization, the welfare cost in the 20th period is some-
what higher, even without growth effects. However, in the growth model
of Barlevy (2004), the welfare loss can be much higher. In his model, a
rise in investment accelerates economic growth less than an identical fall
decreases it. Therefore, eliminating business cycles increases the growth
rate. It is questionable to interpret this as the welfare costs of business
cycles. It provides support for Lucas’ (1987, 2003) view that changes in
the long-term growth rate of consumption have a significant welfare
effect.
The fourth group of studies, including those by Cohen (2000), Ilio-
pulos et al. (2019), Jung and Kuester (2011) and Walentin and Wester-
mark (2018b), assumes that stabilization policy affects the level of
consumption. In the framework of Lucas (1987, 2003), business cycles
are deviations from a trend that leave the long-run level of consumption
unchanged and the welfare costs of recessions are partly offset by the
benefits of booms. Cohen (2000) criticizes the work of Lucas (1987), in
which the aim of stabilization policy is to eliminate both above-trend and
below-trend fluctuations in consumption. He considers that stabilization
policy is aimed at eliminating only below-trend movements, thus
allowing an increase in the mean level of consumption. The welfare
benefit of eliminating all below-trend movements is 1% of consumption
in each period. In the present model, when the extent of hysteresis is in
the range to 0.3 to 0.4, the welfare loss of a single recession ranges from
0.92% to 1.2% of initial consumption in the 20th period.
Walentin and Westermark (2018a) stressed that the welfare losses of
business cycles are insignificant in New Keynesian DSGE models. In Gali
et al. (2007), the welfare costs of all postwar U.S. business cycles are only
0.01% under their baseline parameterization (log utility for consumption
and the Frisch elasticity of one). Moreover, they analyzed the welfare
costs by measuring the cumulative welfare losses over the recession. This
is comparable with the method used in the present paper. Under their
baseline parameterization, the welfare cost of the U.S. recession at the
beginning of the 1990s was 2.3%. In the present model, the welfare cost
in the absence of hysteresis (0.6%) is smaller than that in Gali et al.
(2007), because of the milder and shorter recession. However, the main
finding of this paper is that hysteresis has drastic implications for the
welfare costs of recessions in the basic New Keynesian model. The wel-
fare loss of a moderate recession can be up to 70%, 30 times higher than
the finding of Gali et al. (2007).
Iliopulos et al. (2019) developed a nonlinear DSGE model with
financial and labor frictions. They found that frictions raise aggregate
volatility. This increases the welfare costs of business cycles, consistent
with the second group of studies. Furthermore, frictions imply that the
welfare losses of recessions are higher than the benefits of booms.
Therefore, a rise in the mean level of consumption would be very bene-
ficial. They found that financial and labor frictions can increase the
welfare costs of business cycles by a factor of 21. This paper shows that
hysteresis has more drastic implications for the welfare costs of re-
cessions, since it can increase them by a factor of 121.
The most directly related paper is that by Walentin and Westermark
(2018b). They used a labor market search and matching model with
human capital (learning on-the-job and skill losses during unemploy-
ment). A recession reduces employment. The learning on-the-job feature
means that it diminishes human capital. This creates hysteresis in
employment and eliminating business cycles increases the long-term
level of consumption. The welfare loss of business cycles in the absence
of human capital dynamics is 0.26% in each period. Human capital dy-
namics increase it to 1.52%. Hence, employment hysteresis increases the
welfare loss of business cycles by a factor of six. The findings of this paper
show that modelling the effects of recessions on potential output through
TFP increases the welfare costs of recessions considerably more. The142average degree of hysteresis in OECD countries (0.4) increases them by a
factor of 121.
4.5. Sensitivity analysis
I explore whether the welfare costs of recessions are responsive to
changes in parameter values. Table 3 shows the results. Row 1 presents
the baseline result. In the present model, periods represent quarters.
Strictly speaking, the baseline result is that the welfare cost of a recession
is 47.1% of quarterly consumption. Lucas (1987) sets the discount factor
at 0.95 so his analysis measures the welfare loss of business cycles as a
percentage of annual consumption. In row 2, I use the same value. The
welfare cost measured as a percentage of annual consumption is almost
the same (46.2%).
A difference from Lucas (1987, 2003) is the endogeneity of labor
supply. This feature may affect the welfare costs of consumption risks.
The elasticity of substitution of goods affects the level of initial
employment (equation (11)) and this affects the welfare cost of business
cycles (see equation (13)). In row 3 it is reduced to 6, a common value in
the New Keynesian literature. In row 4 it is increased to 21. Table 3 shows
that the main finding is robust to change in it.
Gali et al. (2007) found that the welfare loss can be responsive to the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Row 5 shows the welfare loss when it is
set at 0.2, following Gali (2015). I underline that the row shows the ef-
fects of varying the Frisch elasticity while I increase the size of the shock
so that the fall in output remains at 3%. If I decrease the Frisch elasticity
and keep the size of the shock constant, then the recession would be
smaller. In this case, the welfare loss of a recession would be smaller. Row
5 illustrates that lower Frisch elasticity reduces hysteresis and the welfare
costs of recessions. Row 6 shows that doubling the Frisch elasticity from
the baseline value of 1–2 has a minor effect on the welfare costs.
The output elasticity of labor is 1 α. In row 7, αis set at 0.33. It is
commonly used in macroeconomics, while the baseline parameterization
followed Gali (2015). It shows that the welfare cost increases mildly to
49.6%. In row 8, αis set at zero and output is linear in labor. Gali et al.
(2007) argue that this assumption is line with the view that changes in
the capital stock are negligible at business cycle frequencies, and that the
capital utilization rate is proportional to employment. Row 8 shows that
the welfare cost decreases to 41%.
Some studies suggest that prices adjust more often than once a year.
Bills and Klenow (2004) found the median duration of prices is 5.5
months. This corresponds to the Calvo parameter of 0.5. This is supported
by Smets and Wouters (2007). In row 8, θis set at 0.5. It shows that the
welfare cost decreases to 38%. A fall in consumption becomes somewhat
shorter and smaller when prices are adjusted more frequently.
The parameters that govern the damage to potential output are the
elasticity of TFP with respect to employment and the persistence of TFP,
which affects the duration of the damage. Chang et al. (2002) discovered
that the persistence of TFP is 0.8 using micro-level data from 1953 to
1997. However, Engler and Tervala (2018) argued that this estimate is
not relevant for recessions. It does not create a hysteresis-like response of
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(2019) found that the persistence of TFP in the traded goods sector is in
the range of 0.95–0.99. In rows 10–12, the persistence is reduced from
0.999999 to 0.99, 0.96 and 0.86. They show that the persistence of TFP
has a significant effect on the welfare cost of business cycles. When the
persistence is 0.96, the value used by Reifschneider et al. (2015), the
negative effect of a recession on TFP fades away quite quickly and the
reduction in consumption is relatively short-lived. This implies that the
welfare cost is drastically reduced to 12.5%. However, in this case it is
misleading to talk about hysteresis because output returns to the initial
level quite rapidly. This is in contrast with the empirical studies showing
that recessions have a highly persistent or permanent GDP effect. When
the persistence of TFP is set at 0.86, output returns very rapidly to the
initial level and the welfare cost decreases to 4.8%. This is still much
higher than the baseline number without hysteresis (0.6%).
In summary, the main results are responsive to the elasticity of TFP
with respect to employment and the persistence of TFP. If the elasticity of
TFP with respect to employment is low, then the damage of a recession to
potential output is weak. Consequently, the welfare cost of a recession is
smaller. If the persistence of TFP is not high, then the damage to potential
output is short-lived. Hence, the welfare costs of recessions are small.
However, the welfare costs of recessions are significant when recessions
affect TFP quasi-permanently. The welfare cost of a recession obviously
depends crucially on its size and duration.
5. Conclusions
Yellen (2016) has observed that deep recessions often challenge
prevailing views about how the economy works and exposed flaws in
economists’ knowledge. She argued that experiences following the Great
Recession indicate that fluctuations in aggregate demand may have a
persistent effect on potential output. She highlighted that addressing this
topic is essential to the work of economic policymakers. In this paper, I
have argued that hysteresis has not properly been taken into account in
the study of the welfare effects of recessions. I show that hysteresis has
important implications for them. In the basic New Keynesian framework,
the welfare costs of recessions are negligible. A small extent of hysteresis,
0.1, raises the welfare cost by a factor of 47 from 0.6% to 27.3% of
consumption. A higher degree of hysteresis, 0.4, increases the welfare
loss by a factor of 121 to 70%. My results are in contrast with Lucas
(1987, 2003), who concluded that the welfare losses of business cycles
are unimportant and only changes in the long-term growth rate of con-
sumption have a major welfare effect. In this paper, the welfare costs of a
recession can be highly significant even without a change in the
long-term growth rate of consumption.
My findings suggest that the welfare costs of recessions may be huge
in the presence of hysteresis. Yellen (2016) emphasized that hysteresis
implies that policymakers should respond quickly and aggressively to a
recession. This reduces the depth and persistence of the recession, and
thus limits the damage to potential output. Reifschneider et al. (2015)
showed that hysteresis provides a solid motivation for a strong monetary
policy response to a recession. Moran and Queralto (2018) stressed that
the dependence of aggregate supply on demand raises the stakes over the
conduct of monetary policy, compared to the traditional view, which
treats the evolution of TFP as exogenous. Engler and Tervala (2018)
found that a fiscal expansion becomes desirable in recessions with hys-
teresis effects, while it is not desirable without hysteresis. More research
is needed so we can have a better understanding of the implications of
hysteresis for the welfare costs of recessions and the conduct of stabili-
zation policy.
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